The European Union's 'potential We' between acceptance and contestation: assessing the positioning of six eastern partnership countries* by Vieira, Alena
The European Union’s ‘Potential We’ between Acceptance and
Contestation: Assessing the Positioning of Six Eastern
Partnership Countries*
ALENA VIEIRA
Research Centre in Political Science (CICP) and University of Minho, Braga
Abstract
The present contribution analyses the European neighbourhood policy and the Eastern Partnership
(EaP), which celebrated its tenth anniversary in 2019, from the perspective of social identity
theory. It is argued that the evolution of both the European neighbourhood policy and the EaP
corresponds to the emergence of a distinct EU identity: its ‘potential we’, which has been defying
the Russian ‘significant we’ extended to the EaP states. Drawing on the framing analysis of
strategic documents and statements, which identifies eight distinct themes, the contribution ascer-
tains three different patterns of EaP states’ interaction with the EU: Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
accepting the ‘EU’s potential we’, Armenia holding to the potential we, and Azerbaijan, as well as
Belarus, contesting the potential we.
Keywords: altercasting; Eastern partnership; European neighbourhood policy; Russia; social identity
theory
Introduction
Since its inception in 2004 the European neighbourhood policy (ENP) has evolved
dynamically. Having survived political turbulence such as the Arab Spring in 2011 and
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, it has been the subject of several reviews and
identified as a priority for EU foreign policy to address. In 2009 it was complemented
by the eastern partnership (EaP), which aimed to invigorate EU relations with
neighbouring eastern states by offering an unprecedented level and breadth of association,
manifested in the association agreements (AAs) and the deep and comprehensive free
trade areas (DCFTAs). However, the negotiation, conclusion and implementation of the
AA/DCFTAs with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova has resulted in the coexistence of very
different types and rationales of relationships with participating states under the same
initiative. These include the three AA/DCFTA-oriented states mentioned above, states
that have reached a special arrangement without the DCFTA (such as Armenia’s compre-
hensive and enhanced partnership agreement [CEPA]) and other states that display no
interest in deepening their contractual relationship (Azerbaijan and Belarus).
As a result, the current motley state of the EaP represents an analytical challenge that
deserves exploration. The EaP celebrated its tenth anniversary in 2019 and currently
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oversees a region that has become a site of competing, if not clashing, EU and Russian
socio-political order. At the same time, the EU has been enduring one of the most difficult
periods in its history with a number of existential challenges, including the global
economic and financial crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit and increased terrorist acts in
member states, all affecting the EU’s image and credibility. Despite such adverse circum-
stances, EaP countries have embraced the AA/DCFTA and their citizens have defended
their decision to follow a pro-EU course, even, as was the case for Ukrainians in the
Maidan, at the cost of their lives.
While both the ENP and the EaP have attracted broad scholarly attention, inspiring
the application of diverse analytical approaches, theories and traditions (Baltag and
Bosse, 2016; Bosse, 2009; Casier, 2011; Whitman and Wolff, 2010), theory-informed
accounts of the policies of the six EaP participants have been rare. This article aims to fill
that gap. In doing so, rather than adopting a view of individual EaP states as mere recip-
ients of EU-promoted norms and values, this study positions itself as part of an emerging
sub-stream of EaP studies that emphasizes the agency of EaP countries and pays special
attention to domestic contexts (Bosse, 2010; Delcour, 2019; Vasilyan, 2016).
The present study adopts a constructivist approach that allows us to consider the mean-
ing that EaP countries attribute to their cooperation with the EU in a particular regional
context also defined by Russia (Busygina, 2017; Samokhvalov, 2017; Verpoest, 2007).
This theoretical perspective informs the choice of analytical framework, which is one that
combines constructivist and symbolic interactionist perspectives with social identity
theory (SIT). Using this approach, three ideal types of EU–EaP interaction are developed,
serving as a point of departure for applying a framing analysis to classify EaP states’
positioning towards the EU (see Tables 1 and 3). This article argues that the diversity
of the EaP is a result of ongoing social interaction between the EU and EaP countries,
accompanied by a constant (re)articulation of their respective identities, and is informed
by the positioning of EaP states towards a particular dimension of the EU’s ‘self’: the
‘potential we’.
The article is structured as follows. The next section presents the analytical framework
and develops the three ideal types of EU–EaP interaction while also discussing method-
ological choices and data. This is followed by the presentation of a distinct perspective on
the emergence and evolution of the ENP/EaP as the EU’s potential we, and a subsequent
exploration of the positioning of the six EaP states, in which eight distinct themes
were identified: civilizational choice, complementarity, conditionality, democracy,
irreversibility, reforms, pragmatism and strategic partnership (see Table 2). The article
Table 1: Three Ideal Types of EU–EaP Interaction
Ideal
type
EaP states’ positioning towards the EU’s potential we
1 Accepting the EU’s projection of self/potential we, reverse altercasting towards Russia as the ‘other’
2 Accepting of Russia’s projection of self as EaP states’ ‘significant we’, reverse altercasting towards
the EU as the other
3 Rejecting both the EU and Russia’s projections of self
Note: Eap, Eastern partnership.
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concludes with a discussion of the findings and a revised classification of EaP states’
positioning (see Table 3).
I. Exploring the Eastern Partnership: The Analytical Framework
To lay bare the current diversity within the EaP, the analytical framework of this study
combines constructivism and symbolic interactionism (Adler-Nissen, 2016; Mead, 1934)
with SIT. Both are underpinned by the assumption that identity is a social construct,
whereby the agent’s self is conceived as complex, contingent, always in the making
and in a special relationship with the other. Additionally, SIT emphasizes agents’ inherent
aspiration to maximize their self-esteem, which is possible only in social relationships and
significant groups (Mols and Webber, 2013; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Another character-
istic of SIT is its focus on categorization processes, which are determined by the other
from which an agent seeks distance, and which is furthermore defined in opposition to
the self, and by a shared significant we that the self strives to become. Thus, the identities
of both the EU and individual EaP states can be analysed through particular categoriza-
tions of the self as a member of a group that is different from others. Contrary to several
constructivist approaches, SIT is not restricted to one particular (ego/alter) social dyad
(Malici and Walker, 2014) and is therefore capable of capturing the complexity of the
social space in which EaP states operate, namely the EU–Russia common
neighbourhood, where belonging to competing social groups is crucially important and
contested (Samokhvalov, 2017).
While adopting the postulates of SIT and its emphasis on categorization, the present
contribution is interactionist in its essence: social processes of interaction are considered
continuous, ‘performative and mutually constitutive’ (Malici and Walker, 2014). The key
mechanism of identity (re)articulation is altercasting, whereby certain self-representations
of one actor are projected onto another. By manipulating symbolic cues to frame how the
latter actor defines social situations, whether positively or negatively, the former actor is
Table 3: EaP States’ Positioning toward the EU’s ‘Potential We’
EaP states Positioning towards the EU’s potential we altercasting
Georgia (IT1) Ukraine (IT1) Accepting the EU’s potential we: civilizational choice and irreversibility
Reverse altercasting: ‘prospective we’ towards the EU, ‘self–other’
towards Russia (negative othering)
Moldova (IT1) Accepting the EU’s potential we: reforms, civilizational choice,
complementarity, irreversibility
Reverse altercasting: prospective we towards the EU
Armenia Holding to the EU’s potential we: democracy and reforms (including
accountability, rule of law, fight against corruption), not at the expense
of the acceptance of Russia’s significant we, and in line with the
complementarity principle
Azerbaijan (IT3) Contestation of the EU’s potential we: strategic partnership
Reversed altercasting: self–other towards both Russia/EU
Belarus Contestation of the EU’s potential we: pragmatism
Acceptance of Russia’s significant we
Note: Eap, Eastern partnership; IT, ideal type.
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eventually forced to adjust their behaviour to target the other actor’s view of themselves
in the given situation (Wendt, 1999). The ENP/EaP can be thus seen as a case of the EU
altercasting or projecting a particular identity of the self onto its EaP partners. The latter
can accept or reject this identity and project their own alternative self onto the EU, in what
is referred to here as ‘reversed altercasting’.
The following analysis of EU–EaP interaction is informed by three ideal types that
represent a ‘synthesis of many diffuse, discrete […] individual phenomena, arranged
according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified thought construct’
(Weber, 1949). The first ideal type rests upon the successful projection of an accepted
EU identity/self onto EaP states. The legitimacy of certain political changes and choices,
be they related to democratization, the promotion of the rule of law, good governance and
reforms in general, derives from a specific discursive representation wherein the identities
of EaP states are associated with the self the EU projects onto them (the potential we).
This implies a rejection of Russia’s significant we and reverse altercasting of Russia as
the other of these EaP states. The second ideal type is a mirror image of the first; the
EaP states accept Russia’s altercasting as their significant we, using their association with
Russia to legitimate their domestic and foreign policies while rejecting the EU’s potential
we and projecting reversed altercasting towards the EU to establish self–other interaction.
Finally, a third ideal type can be distinguished, where neither the EU nor Russia’s projec-
tion of self is accepted and domestic and foreign policies are independent from the
projected identities of Russia and the EU (Table 1).
To uncover how the six states define themselves in relation to the EU’s potential we,
this article employs a framing analysis. Rein and Schön (1993, p. 146) describe framing
as ‘a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality to
provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading, and acting’. Frames result from
actors’ need to reduce complexity while conveying their discourses, acting as ‘interpreta-
tive packages’ (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989, p. 3) that give meaning to an issue by
defining problems, diagnosing causes, making moral judgments, and suggesting remedies
(Entman, 1993, p. 52). The framing approach chosen here (Rein and Schön, 1993;
van Hulst and Yanow, 2016) abstains from predefined frames, allowing these to emerge
from the text. The goal of this analysis is to identify existing frames by establishing
when and how statements invoking the terms integration, European/Eurasian, agreement
(AA/DCFTA), and Russia have been used. By drawing on the three ideal types defined in
Table 1, however, some expectations about the EaP’s framing and the associated
processes of naming, selecting and storytelling can be advanced (Rein and Schön, 1993).
Countries of the first type are expected to adopt the framing that prioritizes the
AA/DCFTA, unlike states that ignore it or frame it as a second-order issue. Their framing
of both the AA/DCFTA and the Russia–Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is expected to
carry an inherent (rather than neutral) valence, that is, a directional bias emphasizing pos-
itive or negative aspects of certain issues or events (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2003),
expressed in salient analogies and metaphors. Increased cooperation and integration with
the EU is expected to be invoked by a particular storyline to further this end, as a
foundation for respective altercasting. Conversely, countries of the second ideal type
are expected to prioritize Russia and the EAEU, corresponding to EaP states’ acceptance
of these as their significant we, while casting AA/DCFTA integration and the EU in terms
of ‘otherness’, a process accompanied by salient metaphors and constitutive framing.
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Further integration with Russia and within the EAEU is predicted to be framed as a nec-
essary or even the right thing to do, expressed in the respective reversed altercasting. Fi-
nally, countries of the third ideal type are expected to abstain from referring to integration
with either the EU or Russia and the EAEU as a guideline for their development,
developing alternative storylines.
To identify frames that unveil the (differential) narratives underlying EaP states’
positioning towards the EU’s potential we between 2009 and 2019, strategic documents
from the six EaP states were examined, namely, their national security strategies (NSS),
national military strategies (NMS), national military concepts (NMC) and military
doctrines (MD). In addition to these 18 documents, 86 key statements (annual addresses,
inauguration speeches, messages to Parliament and statements at international confer-
ences and summits including (United Nations General Assembly sessions and the Munich
security conference) given by EaP state officials with the authority to articulate the
choices of their respective countries are analysed, considering one statement per country
per year from 2009 to 2019 (see Supplementary Information document).1 The statements
were collected from publicly available sources, such as official EaP state institutions
websites and the Wayback Machine digital archive. Official English translations of the
documents and statements were, whenever possible, compared with the originals to verify
the accuracy of the translations from Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian. Triangulation of
the collected data was supported by an analysis of academic publications and newspaper
articles in addition to fieldwork carried out by the author in Kiyv (in May 2013), Minsk
(July 2017) and Brussels (May 2019).
The ENP and the EaP: Emergence and Consolidation of the EU’s Potential We
The origins of the ENP/EaP trace back to the end of the Cold War, which can be consid-
ered a social encounter (Wendt, 1999, p. 267) between the EC/EU and the eastern states.
Faced with the need to define a new relationship with the latter, the EC/EU revised its
long-standing idea of itself as a dynamic economic community of states committed to
liberal values, defined in opposition to Europe’s own warring past as an ideational other
(Flockhart, 2011; Waever, 1998). Following the Treaty of Maastricht the subsequent
consolidation of the EU as an international actor throughout the 1990s was intertwined
with the EU’s eastern enlargement. The latter entailed a large-scale socialization process
to bring central and eastern European countries (CEES) into the liberal institutional order
– underpinned by norms and values such as democracy, the market economy, and the rule
of law – and can be considered successful EU–CEES altercasting. A new facet of the
EU’s self as a socializer (Noutcheva, 2017) and significant we to others was defined,
accompanied by the categorization of eastern states that separated the CEES and the
Baltic states from the commonwealth of independent states. While the former established
a closer association with the EU’s ‘we’, expressed in the CEES’ candidate status that
corresponded to the EU’s prospective we (Flockhart, 2011), the EU has also been
projecting a ‘generalized we’ towards commonwealth of independent states countries,
an identity in which the EU’s self continued to be a socializer and was generally accepted.
1Additional documents (statements given at the EaP conferences, bilateral meetings) were considered in cases when those
named were insufficient to ascertain the framing of the EU’s potential we.
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It was in the context of evolving eastern enlargement and growing enlargement fatigue
that the EU conceived and launched the new ENP in 2004 as a ‘ring of friends’ and a zone
of ‘prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood’ (European Commission, 2003). By offering
a reinforced relationship and support for democratic reforms, the rule of law and a
functioning market economy, the EU simultaneously forged a new identity category,
the potential we, distinct from the already established prospective we corresponding to
EU candidate status (Vieira, 2016). The potential we was defined as ‘more than partner-
ship’ but ‘less than membership’ (Prodi, 2002), and its emphasis on inclusive ‘we-ness’
went hand in hand with reliance on the EU’s enlargement operational mechanisms,
including political conditionality and the acquis communautaire and the (reinforced) role
of the EU as a socializer.
One of the immediate reactions to the ENP came from Russia. Although it was initially
included in the initiative, Russia declared it would not join the mechanism, maintaining
that its status as an EU strategic partner was incompatible with the ENP. The
EU–Russia strategic partnership, underpinned by the four common spaces, has been
increasingly defined by a self–other interaction (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2016) as a result
of Russia’s reversed altercasting aimed at revising the previous interaction pattern
wherein EU-promoted norms and values, including the acquis communautaire, were
generally accepted. While establishing the precedent of rejecting the EU’s potential we,
Russia’s position also defined the EU–Russia strategic partnership as a non-ENP relation-
ship, evolving in opposition to the ENP.
The EaP fostered the evolution of the EU’s potential we, offering further political
association and economic integration. Launched in 2009, the EaP reinforced sectoral
reforms in target countries by ‘highly targeting conditionality at a sectoral level’ (Delcour
and Wolczuk, 2015, p. 499) and established the prospect of an enhanced relationship with
the EU, one with ‘unprecedented scale and intensity of linkages’ (Delcour and
Wolczuk, 2015, p. 499). The AA and DCFTA were the institutional expression of this
new offer and worked towards consolidating the EU’s potential we. Through these
mechanisms, the EU provided economic and financial assistance and access to EU
programmes and agencies, and granted visa-free travel to Moldova (2014), Ukraine
(2017) and Georgia (2017), while also launching pilot initiatives such as the Eastern
Partnership European School in Tbilisi, inaugurated in September 2018. The special
position of three AA/DCFTA states has also been reflected in their sector-specific catego-
rization; for example, the ‘DCFTA facility for small and medium enterprises’ (SME) un-
der the SME flagship initiative.
Unlike the ENP, the EaP raised concern in Moscow (Busygina, 2017). Whereas Russia
regarded the ENP as an initiative with the general aspiration to socialize target states
into the generalized we, replicating Russia’s pattern of interaction with the EU during
the 1990s, the EaP was seen as an attempt to move EaP countries away from Russia as
their significant we. Russia has therefore been eager to strengthen its own integration
project, the Eurasian custom (and, subsequently, economic) union (EAEU) (Smith and
Richardson, 2017), while using carrots, such as loans, natural gas, and oil deals, and
sticks, such as sanctions and blocking imports, tariffs and higher gas prices, to attract
new members (Samokhvalov, 2017).
The extent of Russia’s challenge to the autonomy of the EU’s potential we became clear
at the 2013 EaP Vilnius summit, with Armenia’s U-turn away from the AA/DCFTA
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towards the Eurasian Customs Union, which preceded the EAEU and Ukraine’s decision
to suspend the AA/DCFTA, eventually paving the way for Euromaidan and armed conflict
in Ukraine (Kropatcheva, 2016; Raik, 2017). Since then, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in
March 2014 and military actions in eastern Ukraine have presented constant challenges to
the core of EU identity. This dramatically changing context has forced EaP states to
actively revise their self, significant we and other, both towards Russia and the EU.
II. Accepting the EU’s Potential We: Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
Based on the AA/DCFTAs signed in 2014, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have accepted
the EU’s potential we and adopted a course towards comprehensive reforms, supported by
centralized programming and implementation strategies, despite the difficulties inherent to
the reform process like state capture, selective justice and political instability. In doing so,
two of these three countries, namely Georgia and Ukraine, have displayed what can be
termed ‘civilizational’2 framing. Their strategic documents and discourses frame the
AA/DCFTA as a matter of civilizational belonging and civilizational choice (Bakhtadze,
2018, SI 2.4; Bakhtadze, 2019, SI 2.2; Poroshenko, 2017, SI 1.4) associated with the idea
of a ‘return to Europe’ (Yushchenko, 2009a, SI 1.18). The AA/DFCTA framing also dem-
onstrates a tendency towards constitutive concepts and metaphors, such as a ‘master plan
for Europeanisation and true modernisation’ (Garibashvili, 2014, SI 2.10) and a means to
achieve ‘deep internal Europeanisation’ (Poroshenko, 2018, SI 1.3). In addition to specific
reform achievements and prospects,3 European values (democracy, the rule of law and
good governance) accompany references to the AA/DCFTA. These are phrased in existen-
tial terms as something safeguarding a particular political course, whereby the promotion
of democracy and the reform process is intertwined with the country’s security and
independence and, as a result, the very existence of Ukraine and Georgia as states
(Poroshenko, 2015, SI 1.8; Poroshenko, 2017, SI 1.4), and a ‘guarantee for maintaining
our self-cognition’ (Margvelashvili, 2014, SI 2.9). This ontological security framing of
AA/DCFTA also concerns the separation of both Ukraine and Georgia from their Soviet
past, thereby reinforcing the ‘othering’ of Russia (Delcour, 2019)4 and bringing the theme
of irreversibility to the forefront. Table 2 summarizes the framing analysis of Georgia and
Ukraine as well as other EaP countries.
In Ukraine and Georgia the EAEU is mostly ignored; when mentioned, it is framed as
analogous to the Soviet Union in terms that evoke the opposite of ‘positive feelings and
self-esteem from the alternative group membership’ (Mols and Webber, 2013, p. 512):
‘in essence, nothing other than the Soviet Union on behalf of the Russian Federation’
(Yatsenyuk, 2014, SI 1.10), or ‘a new form of the Soviet Union initiated by Putin to
undermine the progress achieved in our region with respect to NATO and the EU’
(Saakashvili cited in civil.ge, 2013; see Saakashvili, 2013, SI 2.11).
2In the present analysis, the term ‘civilizational’ refers to the political (not cultural and historical) dimensions of EaP states’
identities.
3This is despite Georgia’s initial resistance to some of the EU-promoted reforms prior to 2008 (Delcour, 2019).
4Russia is defined as an occupying power in Georgia’s NMS (2014, SI 2.8) and as an occupying power and aggressor in
Ukraine’s MD (2015, SI 1.6). While the West is criticized in both countries for its appeasement of Russia, there are signif-
icant differences in dealing with the latter, as can be seen by comparing President Saakashvili’s intense negative othering
approach with his successors’ pragmatism and ‘strategic patience’ (Margvelashvili, 2018, SI 2.3).
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Ukraine and Georgia have firmly nested their AA/DCFTA framing in the prospective
we, corresponding with the EU membership perspective. The latter has been framed as a
strategic foreign policy objective in key national strategy documents (Georiga’s NSC,
2011, SI 2.13; Georgia’s NMS, 2014, SI 2.8; Ukraine’s NSS, 2007, SI 1.20; Ukraine’s
NSS, 2012, SI 1.14; Ukraine’s NSS, 2015, SI 1.7). Moreover, both states have enshrined
their commitment in constitutional amendments approved by the Parliament of Georgia in
2017 and by Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada in February 2017 (Constitutional Law of
Georgia, 2017; Law of Ukraine 2,680-VII, 2019). These EaP states have also been eager
to project their own reversed altercasting onto the EU to reaffirm their importance as an
internal part of the European order (Kvirikashvili, 2017, SI 2.5), be it by contributing
to common security and defence policy missions, or by advancing reforms in the frame-
work of the energy community. They have specifically targeted the EU’s prospective we,
as reflected in the idea of ‘four unions with the EU (customs union, energy union,
digital single market, Schengen area)’ promoted by President Poroshenko, in Ukraine’s
vehement rejection of the associated status proposal (UNIAN, 2019), or in President Sa-
lome Zurabishvili’s aspiration to find ‘outside the box’ solutions (Zurabishvili, 2019, SI
2.1) such as ‘accession negotiations on an ad hoc basis’ (cited in Euractiv, 2019).
However, EU officials have rejected EaP states’ reversed altercasting, insisting on a strict
separation of EU–EaP relations from the EU’s prospective we.
While Moldova is similar to Ukraine and Georgia, its cooperation with the EU has
been complicated by especially acute internal polarization and the parallel process of state
capture. The competition between the EU and Russia for the role of Moldova’s significant
we has led reforms (especially associated with economic modernization) to become a
dominant theme in its acceptance of the EU’s potential we. The AA/DCFTA is accord-
ingly viewed as ‘the best and most viable option to deliver prosperity and sustainable
development’ (Filip, 2018, SI 3.4) and to establish ‘civilized standards of living’ (Filip,
2016a, SI 3.7), in addition to ‘strengthening security’ (NSS, 2008, SI 3.20; NSS, 2011,
SI 3.16). This is in spite of the fact that Moldova’s AA/DCFTA framing remains nested
within the prospective we, corresponding to aspirations to EU membership, as a ‘step
on the way to getting the “European passport”’ (Filip, 2016b, SI 3.8) and a ‘bridge to
be crossed’ to enter the EU (Timofti, 2013, SI 3.13). The centrality of reform is
intertwined with Moldova’s credibility and the precedent set when the EU provided
almost unconditional support to the ‘pro-European’ leadership of the country, which
was later associated with state capture and the notorious bank fraud exposed in 2014. This
record affected Moldova’s reverse altercasting towards the EU’s prospective we by
making it generally less assertive in expressing its EU membership aspirations than
Ukraine or Georgia (also prior to 2014, cf. the metaphor of Moldova as ‘not Europe’s
Cinderella’ [Filat, cited in Moldavskie Vedomosti, 2013]).
Though credited with exerting a destabilizing influence that includes ‘economic and
military pressure, propaganda, misinformation and even political bribery’ (NDS, 2018,
SI 3.3), Russia has not been defined as a threat or occupier.5 ‘Close cooperation’ (NSS,
2011, SI 3.16) and ‘dialogue’ (NDS, 2018, SI 3.3) are the themes that characterize the
relationship with Russia, with complementarity emerging as an important theme and also
5Russia’s military presence in Transnistria, along with Transnistria’s own forces, is identified as a ‘threat’ (NDS, 2018, SI
3.3).
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present in pre-2014 Ukraine (Yanukovich, 2010, SI 1.17; Yanukovich, 2011, SI 1.16). EU
integration is repeatedly portrayed as ‘not being directed against Russia’ (Dodon, 2019, SI
3.1; Timofti, 2014, SI 3.11) and as compatible with close cooperation with Russia and the
EAEU, as reflected by Moldova’s observer status in the EAEU (requested by President
Igor Dodon) since May 2018.
Moldova’s framing corresponds to the first ideal type due to the predominance of the
irreversibility theme, which is crucial to the civilizational framing of the other two
DCFTA countries as well. The irreversibility theme concerns both the impossibility of
revoking AA/DCFTA and the need to credit AA/DCFTA achievements for Moldova’s
growing standard of living (Filip, 2018, SI 3.4; Sandu, 2019, SI 3.2). Irreversibility was
also part of Maia Sandu’s reverse altercasting towards the EU, appealing to the latter to
acknowledge and protect Moldova’s pro-AA/DCFTA choice and portraying it as a move
away from the grey zone controlled by Russia (cited in AGERPRES, 2019). The irrevers-
ibility theme has been increasingly accepted even by such critically minded actors as
President Igor Dodon, who previously framed the AA/DCFTA as ‘economic suicide’,
‘premature’ and potentially revocable in a national referendum (cited in Moldavskie
Vedomosti, 2016).
III. Holding to the EU’s Potential We: Armenia
Having initially assumed a course in the direction of the AA/DCFTA and negotiating with
the EU at an advanced level by 2013, Armenia seemed to have accepted the EU’s poten-
tial we. This is aligned with its consistent adherence to the ‘European system of values’ in
official statements (Sargsyan, 2009, SI 4.15; Sargsyan, 2011, SI 4.13; Sargsyan, 2013a, SI
4.10) and its aspiration to ‘consolidate democracy, strengthen the rule of law, and protect
human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (NSS, 2007, SI 4.16). Armenia has also made
tangible progress in its EU-promoted reforms (Delcour and Wolczuk, 2015, p. 492) and
supported the ENP’s ‘more for more principle’ (Sargsyan, 2011, SI 4.13). Armenia’s
adherence to the EU’s potential we has, however, been evolving within a unique context.
In the specific constellation of Armenia’s identity, the valence of the other is occupied by
Azerbaijan and Turkey (Oskanian, 2013), which has forced Armenia define Russia, to at
least partly, as their significant we, expressed in a formal military alliance and strategic
partnership (MD, 2007, SI 4.17), as well as Armenia’s participation in the Russia-led col-
lective security treaty organization (CSTO). The EU’s potential we is therefore accepted
in line with the ‘policy of complementarity’ (NSS, 2007, SI 4.16) and informed by the
country’s ‘deep security consciousness’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Armenia, 2019).
While democracy and reforms emerge as dominant themes in Armenia’s framing,
they correspond to a broader set of values. Armenia declared that its adherence to the
‘European choice’ as a ‘conscious course’, and the ‘persistent adaptation of European
standards into all areas of our political, social and economic lives’ (Sargsyan, 2010,
SI 4.14) is informed by its aspiration to ‘become a modern nation’, which ‘simply cannot
be poor or backward’ (Sargsyan, 2012, SI 4.12). Armenia therefore defends the irrevers-
ibility of state-building according to the European model (Sargsyan, 2013a, SI 4.10),
which encompasses ‘pure and simple concepts: liberty, democracy, a rule-of-law state,
civil society’, all of which ‘Armenia preach[es] to its multinational citizens after having
delivered itself from the clutches of all types of tyrannies, caliphates and empires’
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(Sargsyan, 2009, SI 4.15). Thus, while recognizing that ‘the issue of becoming a full
member of the European Union is not yet on our foreign policy agenda’ (Sargsyan,
2010, SI 4.14), Armenia considers it crucial to implement European rules of the game
and European standards ‘not in order for others to come and assess us negatively or
positively’, (Sargsyan 2014 SI 4.9), but rather because ‘democratic consolidation is the
only way for Armenia to develop’ (Sargsyan, 2014, SI 4.9), to ‘make considerable prog-
ress, to change [the] lives of our citizens and to build up the organizational strength of our
society’ (Sargsyan, 2010, SI 4.14).
Armenian officials nevertheless abstain from subscribing to the narrative of civiliza-
tional choice towards the EU, maintaining that they are not prepared ‘to view that matter
in this dimension’ (Sargsyan, 2013b, SI 4.11) or ‘build its relations with any country at the
expense of another’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Armenia, 2019). Instead, Armenia
aspires to continue to develop parallel ‘relationships and interests with our key partners’
(Sargsyan, 2013b, SI 4.11). This complementarity framing correlates with Russia’s con-
cern about the weakening of its significant we towards Armenia, made manifest in
Russia’s open disagreement with Armenia’s course towards AA/DCFTA and eventually
resorting to alliance coercion and offers of financial and energy cooperation to secure
Armenia’s participation in the EAEU (Vasilyan, 2016). The signing of the CEPA in
2017 has reinforced complementarity as the central theme in Armenia’s framing,
underpinned by the idea that ‘it is possible to accommodate both Armenia’s membership
in the Eurasian Economic Union, with all the commitments stemming thereof, and the Eu-
ropean Union’s deep and comprehensive agenda’ (Sargsyan, 2015, SI 4.8). References to
‘the EU/European’ in Armenia’s strategic discourse have been carefully balanced with the
same number of references to ‘Russia/the EAEU’, especially after 2014 (Pashinyan, 2018
SI 4.4; Pashinyan, 2019a SI 4.1; Sargsyan, 2017, SI 4.5; Sargsyan, 2018, SI 4.3), and
Armenia has expressed a desire to ‘explore the “compatible middle ground”’ (Sargsyan,
2015, SI 4.8) between the EU and the EAEU. Democracy, human rights, political free-
doms, the rule of law and, more recently, accountability, the fight again corruption and
judicial independence maintain their crucial role in Armenia’s framing and are reinforced
by the Velvet Revolution’s reaffirmation of these norms and changes as irreversible
(Pashinyan, 2019 SI 4.2), although increasingly decoupled from references to the EU or
the European system of values (Pashinyan, 2019a SI 4.1; Sargsyan, 2016a, SI 4.6).
IV. Contesting the EU’s ‘Potential We’: Azerbaijan and Belarus
Although both are participants in the EaP, neither Azerbaijan nor Belarus has accepted the
EU’s potential we or demonstrated an interest in the AA/DCFTA: the EU is not seen as
capable of altercasting either of these states as EU socializees, while the EU’s political
conditionality is perceived as interference in domestic affairs, regardless of both states’
compliance with some degree of EU sector-specific conditionality (Ghazaryan, 2014).
Both Belarus and Azerbaijan thus view their relations with the EU in terms of self–other
interaction, even if the latter is the result of two different trajectories, with Russia assum-
ing a different role in the identity of each.
Azerbaijan initially enjoyed a close relationship with the EU through the Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Accordingly, the NSC (2007, SI 5.14) refers to the
‘integration into European and Euro-Atlantic political, security, economic and other
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institutions’ as a ‘strategic goal’ of the country, while the 2006 ENP action plan indicates
that the EU ‘took note’ of ‘Azerbaijan’s expressed European aspirations’ (EU–Azerbaijan
Cooperation Council, 2006). Azerbaijan also seemed to have accepted the EU’s potential
we altercasting, as expressed in a ‘strong desire to establish a new relationship based on
the association agreement’ (Aliyev and Van Rompuy, 2013, SI 5.8) that would also ‘allow
us to be closer to Europe’ (press statements of President Aliyev and Van Rompuy, 2011,
SI 5.10) and ‘apply Europe’s positive experience’ (Aliyev and Van Rompuy, 2012, SI
5.9). Azerbaijan’s assurances that ‘the closer we are to Europe, the more opportunities
we will have for development, for democratic development’ (Aliyev and Van Rompuy
2013, SI 5.8) have been supported by their alignment with the CFSP declarations (since
2007) and the mobility partnership (2013), and reinforced by the strategic energy partner-
ship (2006). Furthermore, close EU–Azerbaijan cooperation has evolved alongside
Azerbaijan’s reluctance to consider Russia as its significant we. The NSC (2007, SI
5.14) states that ‘Azerbaijan engages in a strategic partnership and cooperation with the
Russian Federation’ and the former has abstained from the Russia-led EAEU and CSTO
while being part (and a founding member) of the Organization for Democracy and
Economic Development-GUAM.
However, the EU’s potential we has been increasingly contested in Azerbaijan as
the country has developed its own reversed altercasting aimed at a self–other
interaction with the EU. By 2010 the lack of centralized programming and the overall
selective approach to the implementation of EU-promoted requirements and norms
(Ghazaryan, 2014) led to a stalemate in EU–Azerbaijan relations. The EU’s critical
statements on Azerbaijan’s domestic politics (human rights violations, including
crackdowns on political prisoners, journalists and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgen-
der, intersex and queer community) were met with resentment, and one European
Parliament resolution in 2015 was followed by Azerbaijan’s withdrawal from the
Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, the suspension of their participation in the
EU–Azerbaijan Parliamentary Cooperation Committee and the questioning of their
participation in the EaP overall (van Gils, 2018). In 2013, projecting its reversed
altercasting towards the EU, Azerbaijan asked to substitute the AA, which had been
under negotiation since 2010, with a (lighter) strategic partnership for modernization,
mirroring a similar EU–Russia cooperation format. Despite having initially rejected
the request, the EU reconsidered its position by 2016, following another escalation
of both the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and tensions between Russia and Turkey.
Negotiations for a new agreement began in February 2017.
Azerbaijan’s framing of the AA/DCFTA changed radically to reflect these changes.
The country now considers the AA/DCFTA to be an unacceptable agreement that ‘simply
offered a mechanism that did not look like bilateral but rather like unilateral cooperation’
and that ‘was like a list of instructions to us’ (Aliyev, 2015, SI 5.6). Moreover, this
perspective of the AA/DCFTA has raised the crucial question of whether the EU would
consider Azerbaijan ‘a secondary member, an associate member or just an appendage’
(Aliyev, 2015, SI 5.6), especially considering that, against a backdrop of ‘deep economic’
and ‘spiritual’ crisis in Europe, the very idea of Azerbaijan’s ‘integration’ with the EU
required revision (Aliyev, 2015, SI 5.6). What needed to be identified was ‘a new mech-
anism, a new format and concept of cooperation’, one capable of reflecting equality
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(Aliyev, 2015, SI 5.6) and the special status of Azerbaijan as a country of strategic impor-
tance, which the EaP had been unable to provide (Aliyev, 2017, SI 5.4).6
Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership framing has evolved from a strict separation
between cooperation, which is preferred, and integration, which Azerbaijan is strongly
determined to avoid (Aliyev, 2016, SI 5.5). As ‘not only was Azerbaijan seeking to
deepen cooperation with the EU, but also the EU was seeking cooperation with Azerbai-
jan’ (Aliyev, 2016, SI 5.5), ‘common interests and mutual respect’ rather than political
conditionality should guide the bilateral interaction. Azerbaijan places particular empha-
sis on its strategic partnership agreements with nine individual EU member states,
corresponding to ‘a third of the European Union’ (Aliyev, 2016, SI 5.5), and frames this
as a tangible and positive result outweighing its disagreement with the Commission and
its criticism of the European Parliament. Azerbaijan’s framing also emphasizes the
country’s role as a site of multiculturalism, which contrasts with the troubling instances
of Islamophobia seen in EU countries (Aliyev, 2016, SI 5.5). Furthermore, any consider-
ation of EU–Azerbaijan relations must acknowledge the ‘Azerbaijani contribution to EU
energy security’ and the ‘historic’ southern gas corridor (Aliyev, 2018b, SI 5.3), which
has allowed Azerbaijan to ‘practically redraw the energy map of Eurasia’ (Aliyev,
2018b, SI 5.3). All this reinforces the idea of Azerbaijan’s special status that is incompat-
ible with accepting the EU’s potential we.
As for EU–Belarus relations, these acquired features of negative othering early on,
reflected in sanctions, suspended political dialogue and the absence of a contractual foun-
dation for the relationship, the PCA. Russia has been accepted as Belarus’s significant we,
expressed in the bilateral integration framework of the Russia–Belarus Union State (MD,
2016, SI 6.5), ‘all-encompassing cooperation’ (NSC, 2010, SI 6.13), a formal military al-
liance and Belarus’s support for all Russia-led initiatives, including the CSTO and
ECU/EAEU. However, the rapprochement beginning in the mid-2000s and Belarus’s par-
ticipation in the EaP, albeit limited to the multilateral track, resulted in a mutual ‘positive
othering’. This was reaffirmed by the 2015 decision of Belarusian authorities to release
political prisoners, thus allowing the EU to lift most of its sanctions, and also endorsed
by Belarus’s policy towards Ukraine after 2014 and its hosting of the Minsk talks. These
events have occurred despite the fact that Belarus’s framing continuously demonstrated
the undisputed strategic priority of Russia and the EAEU (‘we do not have and we cannot
have a choice here’ (Lukashenka, 2013, SI 6.10); Russians and Belarusians are ‘one peo-
ple’ – ‘odin narod’ [Lukashenka, 2010, SI 6.14]). Any strategic ambiguity and balancing
between the EU and Russia, ‘as was once done in Ukraine’ (Lukashenka 2010, SI 6.14),
has been portrayed as leading to extremely dangerous results, which neither the EU nor
Belarus could afford.
While clearly setting itself apart from the AA/DCFTA states (Deputy Foreign Minister
Oleg Kravchenko, cited in Belta, 2017) and rejecting comprehensive reforms as some-
thing ill-timed and contradictory to national interests (Lukashenka, 2017a, SI 6.3),
Belarus has adopted a pragmatism framing towards the EU and expresses a preference
for selective engagement and project-based sectoral cooperation. This pragmatism, asso-
ciated with the theme of equality-based cooperation (Lukashenka, 2012, SI 6.11), aims to
6This includes the partnership priorities agreed by the parties in July 2018.
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support a relationship envisaged as an ‘active dialogue on a spectrum of matters of com-
mon interest’ (NSC, 2010, SI 6.13).
A central element of Belarus’s framing is the rejection of EU political conditionality,
portrayed as irresponsible and a source of instability, once again using Ukraine as an
analogy: ‘Don’t you see what your policy towards Ukraine led to, and how it started?’
(Lukashenka, 2017a, SI 6.3). The EU’s credibility as a democratizer or promoter of hu-
man rights is viewed as being undermined by the migration crisis, leading President
Lukashenka to ask, rhetorically, ‘Where is your so-called democracy and tolerance?
How are you treating those migrants, those children dying in the Mediterranean Sea?’
(Lukashenka, 2017a, SI 6.3). This is in addition to the EU’s perceived incoherence, re-
lated to their expectation that Belarus accept 160,000 Ukrainian migrants at a time when
Poland had difficulty ‘digesting’ 5,000 of them (Lukashenka, 2017a, SI 6.3). In this re-
gard, Belarus appears to be the ‘most secure’ transit territory within the wide area
stretching over 1,000km that connects the EU to Russia and China (Lukashenka, 2017a
SI 6.3). Likewise, the EU is expected to accept Belarus’s pragmatic positioning, abandon
conditionality-based engagement (‘Europeans must come to their senses’), and engage in
dialogue to ‘work together for the stabilization of Europe’ (Lukashenka, 2017a, SI 6.3). A
distinct complementarity storyline emerges on the EaP, first and foremost as a platform for
cooperation (which could include intertwining the EaP and the EAEU in the future
[Lukashenka, 2015, SI 6.6]) oriented towards avoiding any lines of division, rather than
forcing participating countries to choose between East and West.
Belarus’s abstention from any negative othering altercasting towards the EU, or from
reasserting the autonomy of its self towards the latter, has been closely associated with the
importance attributed to closer EU cooperation as a means to mitigate the excessively
pro-Russian orientation that existed prior, referred to as ‘flying with one wing’
(Lukashenka, 2017b, SI 6.4). Belarus considers the EU crucial to supporting their sover-
eignty and independence vis-à-vis Russia, which became an especially controversial mat-
ter in light of Russia’s assertive attempts to deepen bilateral integration ever since late
2018. This explains the position of Belarus’s leadership, which, in the context of Brexit,
has expressed its interest in a strong EU, ‘maybe as no one else has done’ (Lukashenka,
2019, SI 6.1). The EU–Belarus positive othering has thus been supporting a ‘free and in-
dependent’ Belarus (Lukashenka, 2009, SI 6.15) and has emerged as an important factor
in the ability of Belarus to maintain a necessary distance from Russia, regardless of the
latter being continuously identified as Belarus’s significant we.
Conclusions
This article has argued that the diversity underpinning the EaP is a result of the position-
ing of individual EaP states’ towards a dimension of the EU’s self, the EU’s potential we.
Attachment to the latter has varied according to the different constellations of EaP state
identities and assumed different institutional expressions. Having used three ideal types
to guide this framing analysis, a (re)categorization of the positioning of EaP states can
now be presented (see Table 3), serving as a basis for the conclusions to be drawn from
this study.
First, the positioning of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova is associated with the first
ideal type, comprising the category of ‘accepting the EU’s potential we’, supported by
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the civilizational choice framing that constitutes these EaP states’ identities. A decade
after the inception of the EaP and despite its existential challenges, it can thus be con-
firmed that the EU acts as others’ significant we and as a source of legitimacy for the
EaP states associated with defining the ‘appropriate’ course of action’ (Casier, 2011; also
see Noutcheva, 2017).
Azerbaijan fits the third ideal type. While rejecting both the EU and Russia’s signifi-
cant we, Azerbaijan has explicitly and actively contested the EU’s potential we by
projecting its own reversed altercasting towards the EU, asserting this in terms of self–
other interaction and demonstrating a preference for a strategic partnership agreement.
At first glance, Armenia and Belarus could be labelled as the second ideal type due to
their recognition of Russia as their significant we. However, Armenia’s special attach-
ment to the EU’s potential we (via CEPA, but also via domestic developments since
2018) places it in its own category; ‘holding to the EU’s potential we’, with the associated
theme of choosing the EU’s potential we but not at the expense of Russia. In this regard,
Armenia’s CEPA, while creating a new model of advanced cooperation with the EU and
setting a precedent for other EAEU countries, also implies a more distant and diluted at-
tachment to the EU’s potential we that acknowledges Russia’s interference in EaP states’
altercasting with the EU. Thus, this analysis points to a potentially problematic relation-
ship between complementarity and (ir)reversibility in terms of acceptance of the EU’s po-
tential we. The fate of the CEPA, either as a positive precedent guiding and supporting the
reform process of EaP (and non-EaP) countries, or a dangerous example causing a reverse
process, including a possible detachment or abandoning of the AA/DCFTA, will eventu-
ally depend on the existence of a ‘collective we’ shared between Russia, the EU, and EaP
states. The latter cannot be taken for granted and therefore remains the main challenge to
any ideas to connect the EAEU and EaP states institutionally.
While Russia continues to feature as Belarus’s significant we, the EU is increasingly
seen as an actor supporting Belarusian independence and sovereignty. Thus, Belarus’s
contestation of the EU’s potential we is different from Azerbaijan’s: while contesting
the essence of the EU’s potential we, Belarus has been careful to avoid compromising
positive othering altercasting with the EU, which is reflected in their pragmatic framing.
Belarus has thus not insisted on a special cooperation agreement or format, whether
within the EaP or beyond. Belarus’s framing and associated altercasting resonates with
the EU’s recent emphasis on pragmatism and resilience, while also highlighting a
challenge for the EU; namely to reconcile the acceptance of states with a status quo
orientation, like Belarus, with the EU aspiration to promote potentially disruptive change
(Joseph and Juncos, 2019, p. 1,002; see Bosse, 2009).
Two additional conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, as a recent dimen-
sion of the EU’s self, the EU’s potential we still tends to be associated with another, su-
perordinate EU identity. When the potential we is contested, this contestation is associated
with the EU’s identity as the socializer and promoter of political conditionality. Similarly,
when AA/DCFTA countries accept the EU’s potential we, they derive the legitimacy for
their effort to promote EU-oriented reforms or democratization from the prospect of a
close association with the EU’s self (EU’s prospective we’), reflected in their respective
reversed altercasting. Ukraine and Georgia have been thus reaching beyond the
AA/DCFTA, challenging it as an identitarian reference point and an unsuitable fit for their
prospective we aspirations. Ideas like ‘four unions with the EU’ (Ukraine) or ad hoc
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accession negotiations (Georgia) confirm the EU’s tendency towards ‘rhetorical entrap-
ment’ (Casier, 2011) in its relations with EaP states and demonstrate a need for further re-
search to identify the principles and mechanisms underpinning the projection of the EU’s
potential we and its influence on the transformation of these countries (Delcour, 2019),
including possible non-enlargement incentives for DCFTA states. More generally, the
demonstrated different ways in which the EaP states have dealt with the EU’s potential
we point to a need for a more fine-grained (framing) analysis of the six states’ positions
beyond the division of the EaP countries into DCFTA/non-DCFTA states.
Second, while the acceptance of the EU’s potential we is not always associated with a
negative othering of Russia, the fact that it is more straightforward to classify EaP states
as belonging to the first rather than the second ideal type attests to the relative success of
the EU’s projection of its identity on its neighbourhood, compared with Russia’s projec-
tion of its significant we. This seems to be correlated with a more pronounced (negative)
reversed altercasting/othering of Russia, as compared with the (positive) reversed
altercasting towards the EU. This finding allows the present research to be connected to
the debate on the attraction of Russia’s ‘soft power’ in its ‘near abroad’ and the associated
dynamics of EAEU integration (Busygina, 2017), while also confirming that the EU–EaP
space of interaction will remain a site of contestation in the future.
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